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JOHNSON v. MISSISSIPPI
108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988)
FACTS
On December 31, 1981, a Mississippi policeman stopped
petitioner and three companions for speeding. While the officer
searched the car, the petitioner stabbed the officer, and follow-
ing a struggle one of Johnson's companions obtained the of-
ficer's gun and killed him. The trial court convicted and
sentenced Johnson to death. The sentencing jury found three
aggravating circumstances, one of which was the fact that the
petitioner had been convicted and imprisoned for one year for a
felony committed in New York. The sole evidence which the
prosecutor presented in support of this aggravating cir-
cumstance, was an authenticated copy of petitioner's commit-
ment to Elmira Reception Center in 1963 after his conviction
for second degree assault with intent to commit first degree
rape in Monroe County, New York. After the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's death sentence, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed the prior convinction.
Petitioner sought post conviction relief on the ground that
the New York conviction was invalid, and could not be used as
an aggravating circumstance. The Mississippi Supreme Court
denied the motion, three justices dissenting. 511 So.2d 1333
(1987). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether the Federal Constitution requires a re-
examination of Johnson's death sentence.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court concluded that allowing a
death sentence to stand, when partially based on a vacated con-
viction, violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1989 (1988).
a) Use of prior invalid conviction in sentencing phase was
prejudicial.
The only evidence concerning the defendant's prior offense
proffered by the prosecution consisted of a document
establishing petitioner's conviction of assault in 1963. Id. at
1986. The Court stated that "the reversal of the conviction
deprives the prosecutor's sole piece of documentary evidence of
any relevance to Mississippi's sentencing decision." Contrary to
the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion, the fact that the peti-
tioner served a sentence pursuant to an invalid conviction does
not give the conviction itself any relevance to the sentencing
decision. The Court held that "it would be perverse to treat the
imposition of punishment pursuant to an invalid conviction as
an aggravating circumstance. Also, because the jury saw no
evidence regarding petitioner's conduct leading to the assault
charge, that conduct is not relevant. The New York conviction
did not legitimately support the death sentence, therefore its use
at the sentencing hearing was prejudicial. Id. at 1986, 1987.
This prejudice is shown by the prosecutor's conduct of
repeatedly encouraging the sentencing jury to give the prior con-
viction weight in balancing the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors "one against the other." Id. at 1987.
b) Inconsistently applied state waiver rule is not a sufficient
ground to affirm the conviction.
The Mississippi Supreme Court found that because the peti-
tioner failed to raise the validity of the New York conviction on
direct appeal, he was procedurally barred from raising the claim
before it. The United States Supreme Court found that the state
did not strictly or regularly adhere to this procedure, and
therefore the procedure "is not an adequate and independent
state ground for affirming petitioner's conviction." Id. at 1988.
c) Jury's consideration of materially inaccurate evidence in-
validated sentence regardless of the presence of other
aggravating factors.
The Court also found Mississippi's argument that the deci-
sion below should be affirmed because the aggravating factor
was not mentioned in the proportionality review of the death
sentence to be without merit. Id. The Court said that the fact
that the New York conviction was not the only aggravating fac-
tor which could support the sentence was not determinative. Id.
The error in the lower court did not merely invalidate an ag-
gravating factor supported by inadmissable evidence, but it
allowed the jury to consider materially inaccurate evidence. Id.
at 1989.
d) Separate Opinions.
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, con-
curred, joining in the Court's opinion, except expressing the
view that on remand the sentencing proceedings should preclude
the reimposition of the death sentence.
Justice White, with whom the Chief Justice joined, concur-
red, suggesting that the Mississippi Supreme Court can decide
whether a new sentencing hearing is required, or if the court
itself can sentence the defendant by reweighing the two un-
tainted aggravating circumstances against the mitigating
circumstances.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
The implication of the Johnson case for Virginia is not
striking. Mississippi has a specific aggravating factor that defen-
dant had been "previously convicted ... of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to [another] person." Miss. Code
1972 Ann. §99-19-101(5)(b) (1988) Crim. Supp. (emphasis add-
ed). Virginia has no such aggravating factor. Although the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson does prohibit the pro-
secutor from presenting evidence of an invalid conviction, it
does not prohibit the prosecution from using proof of prior
unajudicated criminal misconduct to support the 'future
dangerousness' aggravating factor existing in Virginia. Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C)(1988). Defense counsel should note,
however, that it is advisable to request a particular instruction
for the jury in such a case. The judge should tell the jury that
in order to consider prior conduct that has not resulted in a
valid conviction, the jury must make some finding that the
defendant did indeed engage in the prior criminal conduct. The
proposed jury instruction should require the finding be made
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Sandra Fischer)
